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IMPLYING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER TITLE VI
Sheldon Joel Tepler*
The 1964 Civil Rights Act' was an attempt to quickly end racial
discrimination in the United States. It affected the right to vote,
receive an education, and engage in gainful employment. Title VI
of that Act' signalled American outrage that federally funded pro-
grams and institutions, drawing their resources from the monies of
taxpayers of all colors, discriminated on the basis of race.
Title VI proscribes racial discrimination in the administration
of federally funded programs and requires that funding agencies act
against discriminating parties by, if necessary, cutting off the sup-
porting federal funds. The statute places the burden of forcing com-
pliance with the Constitution and Civil Rights statutes squarely on
the shoulders of the federal government. It does not state how a
discriminatee might effect a remedy for a lack of compliance with
the law-nor does it explicitly confer a private cause of action.4
This article does not attempt to divine whether the Supreme
Court would imply a private cause of action for a Title VI litigant.
Rather, I propose to show that if the Supreme Court were to apply
the relevant test for implying private causes of action to Title VI,
none could be implied, but this result would be at odds with eight-
een years of federal case law, the Supreme Court's prior guidance
on the issue, and Congress' post-1964 interpretation of the statute.
* Clerk for the Honorable Richard Sheppard Arnold, United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1976; M.A.,
Columbia University, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1981. The opinions expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a- 1975d, 2000a - 2000h-6 (1976, Supp. II
1978 & Supp. III 1979).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 200d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The text of Title VI is repro-
duced in Appendix A.
3. President Kennedy, in his June 19, 1963 message to Congress said:
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races, con-
tribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or
results in racial discrimination.
Senator Humphrey quoting President Kennedy, 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (1964).
4. Implied private causes of action are judicially inferred rights to relief f.om injuries
caused by another's violation of a federal statute. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 730 n.l (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Initially, the proper test for implying a private cause of action
will be addressed. In Part II this test is applied to Title VI to
demonstrate that no cause of action would be implied. The final
section of the paper suggests that this result is inconsistent with the
law that has developed around this issue in the intervening years
since passage of the Act. The Supreme Court should not apply the
test to Title VI, and it should continue to allow litigants to imply a
private cause of action under Title VI.
I
The Supreme Court first implied a private cause of action in
Texas & Pacfc R Co. v. Rigsby.5 The Court held that when a stat-
ute enacts or prohibits conduct for the benefit of a person, the right
to recover damages is implied--ubijus ibi remedium, where there's a
law there's a remedy.
Subsequently the Court allowed plaintiffs to imply private
causes of action in several cases6 addressing the plaintiffs' rights
under the Railway Labor Act.7 It was apparent in those cases that if
a private cause of action had not been implied plaintiffs would have
had no remedy to enforce the statutory commands which Congress
had written into the Act. This result would have robbed the Act of
its vitality and thwarted its purpose.' However, for a half century
the Court seemed to suggest that no cause of action could be implied
when the statutory scheme already provided an alternative remedy
or when it expressly allowed private suits for a different version-
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of the one (rem-
edy) means the exclusion of others.9
In JL Case Co. v. Borak,10 however, the Court held that a
shareholder could maintain a private cause of action under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," despite Congress'
express creation of an administrative mechanism for enforcing that
statute. The Court reached this result because private suits would
effectuate Congress' intent to eliminate deceitful corporate practices
5. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
6. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employ-
ees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
7. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
8. Switchmen's Union v. Board, 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943).
9. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
10. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1976).
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and protect investors.' 2 Borak inaugurated a decade of greater will-
ingness on the part of the Court to imply private causes of action.'
3
The Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak)1 4 reversed that trend when it
rejected the plaintiffs' efforts to imply a private cause of action
under the Railroad Passenger Service Act of 1970"' to prevent the
defendant from discontinuing a particular intercity train line. The
Court looked to the statute's language, to Congress' intent, 6 and to
whether the private cause of action would effectuate the purpose of
the statute.' 7 It acknowledged that the statute was enacted for the
especial benefit of passengers, but revived the expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius doctrine, and found its application dispositive in de-
termining that no private suits should be permitted.'8 The Act's
legislative history supported this decision--Congress had explicitly
rejected a proposal which would have allowed a private cause of
action, and during the committee hearing the Secretary of Transpor-
tation and labor representatives observed that as the statute was
written none could be implied.' 9
12. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33.
13. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Rosado.v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191 (1967).
14. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
15. 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1976).
16. Although now a court must look to the statute's structure solely for the purpose of
determining congressional intent, this was not always the case. See infra text accompanying
note 55. Under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the statute's language was a factor to be
considered independent from Congress' intent. See infra text accompanying note 22. Theo-
retically a cause of action could have been implied based on the language of the statute even
if a close look at the legislative history indicated that none was intended.
17. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975). But cf.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (without explaining why
the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) "affords (the plaintiff) a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.")
18. A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the
coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. "When a statute limits a thing
to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Bot-
any Mills v. United States, .278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). This principle of statutory
construction reflects an ancient maxim - expressio unas est exclusio alterus. Since
the Act creates a public cause of action for the enforcement of its provisions and a
private cause of action only under very limited circumstances, this maxim would
clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclu-
sive means to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act.
414 U.S. at 458.
19. ld. at 459-60.
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The Court announced a test for implying a private cause of ac-
tion in Cort v. Ash.20 There, the issue was whether a private suit for
damages against corporate directors could be implied in favor of a
corporate stockholder under a criminal statute prohibiting corpora-
tions from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential elec-
tors. . . are to be voted for."'" The Court asked 1) Is the plaintiff a
member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; 2) Is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create or deny such a remedy; 3) Is a private cause of action con-
sistent with the underlying puposes of the legislative scheme; 4) Is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the State, so that it would be inappro-
priate to imply a cause of action based solely on federal law?22 The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and found no private
cause of action in that case.23
The Cort test, however, quickly proved inadequate, and the
Supreme Court has had to reverse the Court of Appeals repeat-
edly.24 It now appears that the Court has abandoned the Cort test in
favor of a test that focuses primarily on congressional intent.
The movement away from Cori first became apparent in Can-
non v. University of Chicago.25 In that case the Court applied the
20. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 and Supp. III 1973) (repealed 1976).
22. 422 U.S. at 78.
23. Id. at 85. It has been said that the Cori decision illustrates the significant philosoph-
ical differences between the Warren and Burger Courts. Whereas "[ulnder the judicially
active Warren Court the absence of express legislative intent was interpreted to permit the
judiciary to fashion remedies to further social and statutory policies. . . JuInder the Burger
Court. .. the absence of express legislative intent militates against implication." McMa-
hon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes ofAction: Reappraisal and Retrench-
ment, 80 DIcK. L. Rlv. 167, 191 (1976). This observation though true of later cases is not
true of Cort. Cori was a unanimous decision. Four of the Justices who voted in Cort voted
in the unanimous Borak decision. Cort is of course restrictive to the extent that it establishes
criteria, but at least some members of the Court merely intended for it to guide the lower
courts on when and when not to imply private causes of action. Subsequently many lower
courts continued to imply private actions. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
741-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Cort did not intimate which of the four factors, if any, were of greater signif-
icance. This allowed lower courts to rely on that factor under which it would be easiest to
imply private causes of action. But see Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977)
(the Court refused to imply a private cause of action mainly because it would not effectuate
the statute's purpose).
24. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
25. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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four-pronged Cort test for the purpose of determining whether Con-
gress intended to create a private cause of action under Section
901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.26 The
petitioner alleged that the University of Chicago and Northwestern
University Medical Schools had admissions policies which discrimi-
nated against women in violation of Title IX. The Court held that a
private cause of action could be implied.
The Court began its analysis by first observing that "before
concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to a
special class of litigants, a court must carefully analyze the four fac-
tors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an intent? ' 27 It then
looked at the language of Title IX to see whether the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff was a
member. The Court concluded that whereas the statute in Cort was
enacted for the protection of the general public, Title IX was drafted
"with an unmistakable focus on the benefitted class."' 28 The major-ity laid great emphasis on this. 29 Thereafter it considered the legis-
lative history of Title IX and determined that it was Congress' intent
to create a private cause of action. The Court believed that the dual
purpose of Title IX was to stop the government from supporting
institutions which discriminated unfairly and to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices. Private remedies
would effectuate the latter goal. Finally, discrimination was not pri-
marily a state issue for which a private remedy in the federal courts
would not be appropriate. The Court allowed the plaintiff to imply
a private action but indicated extreme reluctance to do so, and
though applying the test, it stressed that its result had to comport
with Congress' intent.30
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1976).
27. 441 U.S. at 688.
28. Id. at 691.
29. Id. at 690 n.13.
30. When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support
their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it cre-
ates those rights. But the Court has long recognized that under certain limited
circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent with an intent on
its part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation.
Title IX presents the atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the
Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are present.
We therefore conclude that petitioner may maintain her lawsuit, despite the ab-
sence of any express authorization for it in the statute.
Id. at 717. In dicta, Cannon further limited a plaintiffs chances to imply a private cause of
action. In Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the plaintiff merely had to
show that he was a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.
1983]
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Cannon was decided by a deeply divided Court. Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the judgment but wrote no opinion.3 Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist also concurred, and while lauding the
Court's movement away from Borak, they suggested that the
Court's analysis should focus even more on Congress' intent. They
also intimated that in the future they would less readily allow plain-
tiffs to imply a right to private suits.
It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly
adverted apprise the lawmaking branch of the Federal Govern-
ment that the ball, so to speak, may well now be in its court. Not
only is it "far better" for Congress to so specify when it intends
private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason
this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a
cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legisla-
tive Branch. 2
Justice White, in a dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, contended
that the majority had incorrectly construed Title VI's legislative his-
tory, and that Congress did not intend for it to provide a private
cause of action.33
Justice Powell dissented, arguing that the Cori analysis had to
be reappraised because it was an open invitation for federal courts
to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress, in violation
of article III of the Constitution.34 He suggested, moreover, the
Borak suggested that the protection of that class had to be one of the chief purposes of the
statute. Cori required that the protection of that plaintiff be the primary purpose of the
statute. In Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691, the Court indicated that it would be necessary to show
that the statute was drafted "with an unmistakable focus on the benefitted class ......
More recently the issue of whether the statute was meant to protect a particular class has
become secondary, though it may be illustrative of legislative intent. See infra text accom-
panying note 55.
31. Chief Justice Burger's cryptic concurrence may suggest that he is no longer comfort-
able with his position in Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967),
that Title VI does provide litigants with a private cause of action. Cannon, to a large degree,
was based on the assumption that a private cause of action could be implied under Title VI.
See infra text accompanying notes 97-8.
32. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Commentators have argued
that the realities of legislation make it impractical to restrict federal courts from implying
private causes of action. "Legislative is often ambiguous because compromise with the at-
tendant loss of clarity is required for passage of the legislation. Such a result may be unfor-
tunate, but at least frequently in our system, it is the nature of the legislative process."
Steinberg, Implied Private Rights ofAction Under FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41
(1979). Justice Rehnquist now speaks for a majority and his view forecloses this argument.
33. Id. at 718 (White, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting). Under a Cori analysis it would be possible to
imply a private cause of action even if Congress intended none, if doing so would effectuate
the purpose of the statute. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
[Vol. 6:19
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existence of one statutory remedy should in most cases preclude the
implication of another.35
The Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington36 reaffirmed the
primacy of congressional intent. The issue was whether customers
of securities brokerage firms required to file financial reports with
regulatory authorities under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19343' have an implied cause of action for damages under
section 17(a) against accountants who audit such reports, based on
misstatements contained therein. The Court focused on the statute's
language. But whereas previously it had done so for the purpose of
showing whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a particu-
lar class, in this case the Court limited its task solely to determining
Congress' intent.38 The statute merely required that broker-dealers
keep records and file such reports as the Commission might order.
It neither conferred rights on private parties nor proscribed any par-
ticular conduct. Without explicitly saying so the Court recalled the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim. Section 17(a) is flanked
by provisions of the Act which expressly provide private causes of
action. This indicated that "when Congress wished to provide a pri-
vate damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.
'39
Having found that neither the statutory language nor legislative his-
tory of the Act supported finding a private cause of action, the in-
quiry ended without an examination of whether a private remedy
would effectuate the purpose of the statute or whether the enforce-
ment of section 17(a) was a matter of federal or state concern. The
four-pronged Cort test was discarded. If the first two Cort factors
showed Congress' intent to deny a cause of action the Court would
not look any further.40
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis4 plaintiffs at-
tempted to imply a private cause of action under sections 80b-1542
and 80b-643 of the Investments Advisers Act of 1940. Once again
the Court looked to Congress' intent and analyzed it in light of the
35. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
38. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
39. Id. at 572.
40. Id. at 575-76. See Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America,
451 U.S. 77, 94 n.31 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981).
41. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
1983l
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:19
statute's structure and legislative history. Though holding that sec-
tion 80b-15 allowed private suits, the Court expressly relied on the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim to hold that section 80b-6
did not." The Court held as it did even though the plaintiff was a
member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted. This factor shows an intent to create private suits, but the
Court evidently does not believe that it alone will help litigants. As
in Touche Ross, the Court ended its inquiry after determining that
under the first two Cort factors no private cause of action could be
implied.45
The Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
44. "When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the
negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289. See
Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458; Securities Investor Protection.Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.
412, 419; TLME, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471. Congress expressly
provided both judicial and administrative means for enforcing compliance with
§ 206. First, under § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17, willful violations of the Act are
criminal offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 au-
thorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in federal courts to enjoin compli-
ance with the Act, including, of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is
authorized by § 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons who
violate the Act, including § 206.
444 U.S. at 20.
45. During the 1980 teri the Court decided Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America,
451 U.S. 77 (1981), and California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). In each of these cases
the Court rebuffed attempts to imply a private cause of action. However, despite Touche
Ross and Transamerica the Court adhered closely to the Cort analysis. Though reiterating
that the ultimate issue was congressional intent, thefourfactors specified in Cort remained
the criteria through which intent could be discerned. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Sierra
Club, attacked this analysis:
My only difference, and the difference which leads me to write this separate con-
currence in the judgement, is that I think the Court's opinion places somewhat
more emphasis on Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), than is warranted in light of
several more recent "implied right of action" decisions which limit it. These deci-
sions make clear that the so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the central
task of ascertaining legislative intent. . . .that they are not of equal weight...
and that in deciding an implied-right-of-action case courts need not mechanically
trudge through all four of the factors when the dispositive question of legislative
intent has been resolved. . . .Surely it cannot be seriously argued that a mechani-
cal application of the Cori analysis lends "predictability" to implied-right-of-ac-
tion jurisprudence: including today's decision, five of the last six statutory implied-
right-of-action cases in which we have reviewed analysis by the Courts of Appeals
after Cort have resulted in reversal of erroneous Court of Appeals decisions ....
While this may be predictability of a sort, it is not the sort which the Court in Cort
v. Ash, supra, or in any other case seeking to afford guidance to statutory construc-
tion intended.
451 U.S. at 302-03 (citations omitted) Justice Rehnquist's view has prevailed. See imfra text
accompanying notes 51 and 55.
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Sea Clammers Association,4 reiterated that the more comprehensive
a statute's remedial scheme, the more difficult it is to imply a private
cause of action; it also came very close to abandoning the Cort anal-
ysis altogether. The plaintiffs brought a suit under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)47 and the Marine Protection
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA)41 seeking damages
and injunctive relief for pollution of the Hudson River estuary and
the Atlantic Ocean by New York and New Jersey sewage authori-
ties. The Court made the following analysis:
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement provi-
sions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on gov-
ernment officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for example,
authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to violations of the
Act, with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319. He may seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day, id.,
§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), and criminal penalties also are
available, id. at § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). States desiring to
administer their own permit programs must demonstrate that
state officials possess adequate authority to abate violations
through civil or criminal penalties or other means of enforce-
ment. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). Id. . . . In addition, under
§ 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), "any interested person" may seek
judicial review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various
particular actions by the Administrator, including establishment
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of pol-
lutants. Where review could have been obtained under this pro-
vision, the action at issue may not be challenged in any
subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. Id. at
§ 1369(b)(2).
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their
counterpart under the MPRSA, are supplemented by the express
citizen-suit provisions in § 505(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a), and § 105(g) of the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). See
nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit provisions authorize private
persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these statutes. Plaintiffs
invoking these provisions first must comply with specified proce-
dures-which respondents here ignored-including in most cases
60 days' prior notice to potential defendants.
In view of these elaborate enforcements provisions it cannot
46. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
47. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections
of 12, 15, 31 and 33 U.S.C.).
48. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections
of 16 and 13 U.S.C.).
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be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication
additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under
MPRSA and FWPCA.49
When the structure of the statute-in this case the broad remedial
scheme--evidences an intent to deny a private cause of action, none
will be implied absent legislative history showing a contrary in-
tent.50 The Court added that there was nothing in the legislative
history suggesting that the statute was meant to provide for private
suits. The Court's analysis merely adverted to Corr.
51
The issue in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran5 2
was whether a private party could maintain a cause of action under
Title VII, section 6b of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) as it
had been amended in 1974.13 The Court acknowledged that Con-
gress' intent was the test for implying a private cause of action, but
instead of applying the Cort factors for guidance, it focused on the
state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted and particu-
larly on Congress' perception of the law it was shaping. It observed
that prior to the 1974 amendments to the CEA federal courts had
routinely implied private causes of action and that "[in that context,
the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant amend-
ment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which the
federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy. ' 54 The
legislative history of the CEA supported that conclusion. The Court
explicitly recognized that congressional intent was the sole test for
implying a private cause of action and implicitly recognized for the
first time that the Cort factors are merely indices of Congress' intent
and need not be trudged through if the intent can otherwise be
discerned.55
49. 453 U.S. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
50. Like Amtrak, Touche Ross and Transamerica, Middlesex derives sustenance from
the expressio unius est exclusto alter/us rule. See a/so Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 n. 11.
None of these cases, however, provide guidance on what degree of comprehensiveness will
preclude the implication of another remedy.
51. 453 U.S. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52. 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
53. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A)(C)(1976).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
55. Id. at 1844, 1848 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285 Amalgamated Transit Union, 102 S. Ct.
2202 (1982), the issue was whether litigants could sue in federal court rather than a state
court. The Court observed that the private right of action decisions were instructive and that
"[w]henever we determine the scope of rights and remedies under a federal statute, the criti-
cal factor is the congressional intent behind the particular provision at issue." Id. at 2207.
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In sum, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the current
test for implying a private cause of action is congressional intent.
To the extent that Cort may have suggested something else, it has
been overruled. This means that litigants will now bear a greater
burden when trying to imply a private cause of action. It is no
longer enough to show that a private suit would effectuate the pur-
pose of the statute or that it is suggested by the language of the
statute. These factors are helpful but not dispositive. A plaintiff
must go further and show Congress intended a cause of action. This
will be difficult because legislative history is unlikely to reveal af-
firmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize an action
not mentioned in the statute itself.56 Moreover, congressional intent
to deny a private cause of action will be readily inferred where the
statute contains a broad and complex remedial scheme.
II
With the above principles in mind, I turn now to Title VI to
determine whether Congress intended to create through it a private
cause of action. The implementing section of Title VI elaborately
states the procedures for preventing federally funded programs from
discriminating on the basis of race. Each federal department and
agency empowered to expend federal funds bears the burden of en-
forcing compliance with Title VI.57 They may do so by terminating
federal assistance or by any other already existing means authorized
by law. 8 The rest of the statute deals exclusively with what proce-
dures the agency must follow before effecting an action. If the ex-
56. In recent years, however, a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens
imposed upon the Federal Judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress,
and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to
open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, the Court cut back on the simple common-law presumption by fashioning a
four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in that case. Although multi-
factor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative answers, more recently
some Members of the Court have been inclined to deny relief with little more than
a perfunctory nod to the Cori v. Ash factors. The touchstone now is congressional
intent. See ante, at 13. Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative
evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specqfc procedure that the statute
itselffails to mention, that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private
remedies.
(citations and footnotes omitted). Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 24-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976).
58. The statute says "by any other means authorized by law." During the congressional
debates Senators Pastore and Ribicoff explicitly noted that it refers to existing means. See
infra text accompanying notes 72 and 74.
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pressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim has the force which the
Supreme Court suggests it has, then a negative inference for imply-
ing a private cause of action has been created by Title VI's
language.
A comparison of Title VI with other titles of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act supports this negative inference. Titles I19 and V1I 60 of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act explicitly provide for private causes of
action. Title VI was enacted at the same time and like them it ad-
dressed race discrimination. Obviously Congress knew how to pro-
vide a private cause of action but chose not to when it enacted Title
VI. Moreover the legislative history of Title VI indicates that Con-
gress believed the expressio unius doctrine was a significant rule of
statutory construction and that by providing Title VI with one rem-
edy and not another it was creating a negative inference. 6' To imply
a private cause of action would be going against Congress' intent.62
The legislative history of Title VI gives every indication that
Congress did not intend to create any remedies beyond those which
were explicitly promulgated. Neither its opponents nor advocates
viewed it as a self-help statute, but as a paternalistic one through
which the government could protect discriminates. There were at-
tempts made to include within it an express right to initiate private
suits, but they were defeated. On several occasions its proponents
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
61. Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator from Tennessee know as a lawyer that
when the courts undertake to ascertain the intent of a legislative body from the
language of an act, one of the chief rules they rely upon is that the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another?
Mr. GORE. That is one of the rules of construction, as I understand it ....
Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina is a far abler
lawyer than I. He has a great deal of experience, both in the practice of law and as
a member of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. I would not be in a position,
therefore, to match knowledge or wits with him with respect to rules of construc-
tion.
It is my general view and recollection that one of the rules of construction with
respect to legislative intent is that the inclusion of one to the exclusion of the other
is for a purpose, and that the exclusion is given due weight in undertaking to reach
the intent and purpose of the act.
110 Cong. Rec. 9087 (1964).
62. This barrier did not exist when the Supreme Court analyzed Title IX in Cannon,
although like Title VI it does not expressly allow a private cause of action. Whereas Titles
II, VI and VII all address race discrimination and were enacted contemporaneously in 1964,
Title IX addressed gender discrimination and was passed in 1972. When Congress passes a
series of statutes addressing a particular issue, e.g., race discrimination, but includes a right
to private suits in one statute but not the other, a negative inference is created. This was not
the case with Title IX.
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expressly stated that Title VI did not provide a private cause of ac-
tion. The attacks leveled against Title VI also shed light on Con-
gress' intent. Though bitterly criticized as vesting unprecedented
power in the executive branch of the government and as overly
broad in its remedial scope, no one suggested that it gave the federal
judiciary too much power or that its passage would spawn volumi-
nous litigation.
Opponents of Title VI attacked it for giving the federal govern-
ment new and unprecedented powers of coercion. They believed it
was "the most expansive blueprint for governmental tyranny which
has ever been conceived in the mind of any man on the North
American Continent," allowing the government to enforce its race
policy by threatening to cut off funds.6 3 It was bitterly criticized for
allowing the federal government to interfere with the operation of
public schools' as well as private institutions.65 They contended it
would allow any federal bureaucrat to withhold funds arbitrarily. 66
No one suggested that it authorized litigants to sue in federal courts,
and would thereby give the federal courts new power. Nor did any-
one advert to the voluminous and costly litigation a new private
cause of action would engender. When, as in this case, the scope
63. 109 Cong. Rec. 15422 (1963).
64. 110 Cong. Rec. 5874 (1964).
65. The following exchange shows what was perceived as the outer limits of
remediation.
Mr. ERVIN. This illustrates the extent of the tyrannical power which the bill
would vest in the President, acting either in person or through any designated Fed-
eral executive agency. It is the most tyrannical proposal made to Congress during
our lifetime.
Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator from North Carolina.
Now I should like to ask my next question: In my State and also in the State
so ably represented by the Senator from North Carolina, and also in %he States
represented by other Senators now in the Chamber, as the Senator from North
Carolina well knows, there are educational institutions organized and operated by
Negro churches or Negro private groups. They are operated exclusively for the
education of the youth of that race. Am I correct in my understanding that under
title VI of the bill, if that course as determined upon long prior to the time when
these various colleges were founded-were pursued, they, too, could lose their en-
tire power of borrowing from Federal funds set up to aid them on a self-liquidating
basis to build on their campuses needed dormitories and other facilities?
Mr. ERVIN. There would be no question of the power of the President to do
that if the bill should pass and be adjudged constitutional. The bill would be
broad enough to empower the Federal Government even to deprive the libraries of
such colleges of the benefit of the law under which certain Federal publications are
given to such libraries.
109 Cong. Rec. 15421 (1963).
66. 110 Cong. Rec. 6049 (1964).
67. The Court, in Cannon, suggests that this precise argument was made by Senator
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of the remedy was extensively debated and bitterly attacked, the ab-
sence of any reference to a private cause of action certainly suggests
it was not at issue.
Title VI inaugurated sweeping changes: by conditioning funds
upon the equal treatment of black and white citizens it amended
every federal statute appropriating funds.68 Precisely, however, be-
cause of Title VI's obvious impact, its proponents carefully pointed
out that it was not intended to affect anything beyond that which it
Talmadge of Georgia. However, a close look at the legislative history shows that Senator
Talmadge was referring to the right of judicial review to which a discriminating agency is
entitled under section 603 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-2 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and not to
the litigation which may arise from private suits. His argument, moreover, was that the
independence of various entities would be threatened by the federal government, not byfed-
eral courts.
Mr. TALMADGE. If the Senator will turn to page 26, section 602, he will see
that it reads:
Sec. 602. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, shall take action to effectu-
ate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity.
I say to the Senator that the House had the good judgment to eliminate sav-
ings and loan associations.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.
Mr. TALMADGE. I continue to read:
Such action may be taken by or pursuant to rule, regulation, or order of gen-
eral applicability and shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the
statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
taken.
Never in the history of our Republic, in my judgment, has any language so
broad, so barbarous, so completely in disregard of the coequal, separate, and coor-
dinate branches of Government, been handed to Congress.
This proposal would authorize a Federal official to disregard the acts of Con-
gress from the beginning of Congress to the present time, and disregard, in totality,
appropriations, and say, "I am the law; I am the rule; you must do it my way."...
If the Senator will look at page 27, section 603, he will find that any judicial review
would come only after the money had been cut off, not before. Let me point out
that this provision is so broad that if two people, person A and person B, applied
for a job to cut weeds in the State of New Mexico, on the shoulders of a road, and
the highway department employed B, the Federal Bureau of Roads would be in-
volved in the question of whether or not the Statefollowed a correctpolicy in hiring B
to the exclusion of A, and would be empowered to withhold every dime of the
appropriation for highway aid to the State of New Mexico.
The Senator from Minnesota, able and eloquent as he is, cannot argue that a
Federal agency should have such power.
110 Cong. Rec. 5253 (1964) (emphasis added).
68. Minority Report upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary
Substitute for H.R. 7152, H.R. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st sess., (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad News 2431, 2453.
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
explicitly stated. Senator Ribicoff, one of its sponsors,6 9 noted that
Title VI did not confer any new federal rights but was merely an
exercise of the government's power to condition the disbursement of
funds. 70 He also stated that backers of the bill advocated a narrow
and strict interpretation of its contents.
71
The statute provides for a right to enforce it "by any other
means authorized by law." This broad statement could have been
viewed as creating a private cause of action, but Title VI's advocates
flatly rejected this interpretation. Senator Pastore said the language
meant that Title VI does not repeal existing law. He expressly
stated that that particular phrase does not confer any new rights.72
Throughout the proceedings Senator Ribicoff reiterated that
fund cutoffs were a last resort and that lawsuits were preferable be-
cause they were less drastic. Given the opportunity, he would have
allowed the statute to create a private cause of action.73 He did not,
however, interpret the language that way. He agreed with the view
that it merely meant that the Attorney General could initiate a law-
suit under Title IV 7 of the Civil Rights Act if the alleged offender
was a school district or public college or that a funding agency could
force compliance by promulgating rules and regulations condition-
ing funding upon a contractual agreement not to discriminate. 75 It
did not create a private cause of action.
Senators Ribicoff and Pastore believed that the full sweep of
Title VI would be curtailed by its many procedural safeguards.76
Prior to suit the government has to confer formally and informally
with the alleged violator. The statute provides that the offending
party be advised of his failure to comply and that the government
attempt to secure voluntary compliance.77 These procedures are
designed to avoid litigation.78 If private suits were permitted, these
expressly mandated procedural safeguards could be bypassed and
Congress' express intent to allow offenders to avoid litigation
undermined.
69. Remarks made by a sponsor of an act are particularly useful in determining legisla-
tive intent. Eg., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1920-21 (1982).
70. 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 (1964).
71. Id. at 8427.
72. Id. at 7060.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976).
75. 110 Cong. Rec. 7060 (1964).
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
78. 110 Cong. Rec. 7060 (1964).
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Title VI's advocates intended for it to be a paternalistic remedy
through which the government could protect individuals who could
not shield themselves from discrimination; it was not intended to be
a self-help statute providing discriminatees with a right to litigate.
Congress did not believe that a new statutory right to sue would end
discrimination. It recognized that discriminatees were poor and
could not afford the high costs of litigation.79 There was, moreover,
no guarantee that a court order would be universally followed, and
possibly every victim of discrimination would have to litigate his
claim."0 The forces of discrimination were simply more powerful
than the individuals whose rights were being abridged.8 ' Congress
had to devise a remedy other than a right to sue. Title VI is such a
remedy. It enables discriminatees to complain to the government
and require it to bear the burden of forcing at least federal agencies
to comply with the law.
8 2
Representative Gill and Senators Keating, Kuchel and Ribicoff
explicitly stated that the statute as it was passed did not provide a
79. 110 Cong. Rec. 6050 (1964).
80. Senator Pastore noted that although Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), held that portions of the Hill-Burton Hospital and Survey and
Reconstruction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976), tolerating separate but equal facilities,
were unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses, that ruling was
not being followed.
The Supreme Court declined to review that decision; so it is the law of our land.
Yet, despite the effort of the court of appeals to strike down discrimination in the
Simkins case, the same court was forced last week to rule again in a Wilmington,
N.C., suit.
That is why we need Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, H.R. 7152--to prevent
such discrimination where Federal funds are involved.
110 Cong. Rec. 7054 (1964).
Those who opposed Title VI also viewed it primarily as a club with which the federal
government could enforce the rights of discriminatees. Senator Robertson protested that
under it, if an employer refused to hire a black man, the black man could say the following.
"I am going to the Attorney General and complain." What does title III pro-
vide? It provides that the Attorney General may say, "Start a suit." Once you start
it, let me know, and I will be there with all the Federal Government behind me."
That is the title III, which was defeated overwhelmingly only a few years
ago-in 1957. Yet it is in the present bill.
Id. at 8425.
81. Id. at 1540.
82. An examination of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-6
(1976 & Supp. V 1979), suggests why Congress did not intend Title VI to provide a private
cause of action. Whereas Title VI makes government action mandatory, the enforcement
provision of the Voting Rights Act provides that the Attorney General "may institute...
an action .... " 42 U.S.C. 1973j (d)(1976). In the latter instance it is necessary to imply a
private cause of action to supplement discretionary government suits. Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 n.21 (1969). This is not true of Title VI.
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
private cause of action. Representative Gill and Senator Kuchel
noted that the statute, far from being radical and coercive, protected
all discriminators from an overzealous federal government seeking
to cut off funds, but gave the discriminatee no new rights.83
Senators Keating and Ribicoff believed that cutting off federal
funds was a radical measure to be used only as a last resort.84 For
that reason they proposed an amendment which would have explic-
itly allowed private suits as an alternative remedy:
Whenever any person has engaged ... in any act or prac-
tice which would deprive any other person of any right or privi-
lege secured by the nondiscrimination requirement of section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, a civil action or other proper
proceeding for preventive relief. . . may be instituted (1) by the
person aggrieved ....
"(b) The district courts of the United States shall have juris-
diction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and
shall exercise the same without regard to whether the party ag-
grieved shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedy
that may be provided by law."8 5
After the amendment was defeated Senator Keating reiterated that
he and Senator Ribicoff wanted the statute to contain a private
cause of action, but that their proposal was rejected.8 6 He noted that
he was speaking in order to clarify the legislative history of Title
VI, 7 and evidently to indicate that Congress did not intend to create
a new private cause of action. Senators Keating's and RibicofFs re-
83. Representative Gill said:
Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action for a
person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in the benefits of
Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been cut off can go to court and
present their claim.
110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964). Senator Kuchel observed:
[A] good case could be made that a remedy is provided for the State or local
official who is practicing discrimination, but none is provided for the victim of that
discrimination.
Id. at 6562.
84. Id. at 7065.
85. 109 Cong. Rec. 15375 (1963).
86. Parenthetically, while we favored the inclusion of the right to sue on the part of
the agency, the State, or the facility which was deprived of Federal funds, we also
favored the inclusion of a provision granting the right to sue to the person suffering
from discrimination. This was not included in the bill. However, both the Senator
from Connecticut and I are grateful that our other suggestions were adopted by the
Justice Department.




marks, as those of the sponsors of some of the language ultimately
enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction."8
There is additional evidence that members of Congress consid-
ered including a private cause of action while Title VI was still
before the House Subcommittee. Between May 8, and August 2,
1963, Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee of the Judiciary con-
ducted hearings on the administration's proposed civil rights bills.
It listened to other proposals and rewrote the Act. Its version of
Title VI was, in part, the following:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by suit under section 703 of this title,
(2) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assist-
ance upon an express finding that there has been a failure to
comply with such requirement, or (3) by any other means author-
ized by law. 9
The Committee, however, deleted section 703 and the private suits
remedy.' This suggests that the committee which finally drafted
the statute intended to preclude a right to a private cause of action.91
III
The touchstone for implying a private cause of action is con-
gressional intent, and Title VI's language and legislative history in-
dicate that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of
action. This conclusion, however, is at war with eighteen years of
federal court decisions and Congress' postenactment understanding
of the statute.
The Supreme Court has on three separate occasions intimated
that Title VI does provide litigants with a private cause of action. In
Lau v. Nichols9  the Court held that the San Francisco public school
system violated Title VI by failing to provide English language in-
struction to approximately one thousand students of Chinese ances-
try. The Court noted that it did "not reach the Equal Protection
Clause argument which has been advanced but rely solely on 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, to reverse the Court
88. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
89. Minority Report upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary
Substitute for H.R. 7152, H.R. No. 914 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad News 2431, 2454.
90. Id.
91. See Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
92. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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of Appeals. ' 93 It did not inquire whether a private cause of action
could be implied, but merely assumed this to be the case. 94
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke95 Justices
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun assumed for the pur-
poses of that case that Title VI did create a private cause of action.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart
held that Title VI does create a private cause of action.
Because petitioner questions the availability of a private cause of
action for the first time in this Court, the question is not properly
before us....
Even if it were, petitioner's original assumption is in accord with
the federal courts' consistent interpretation of the Act. To date,
the courts, including this Court, have unanimously concluded or
assumed that a private action may be maintained under Title VI.
The United States has taken the same position; in its amicus cu-
riae brief directed to this specific issue, it concluded that such a
remedy is clearly available, and Congress has repeatedly enacted
legislation predicated on the assumption that Title VI may be en-
forced in a private action. The conclusion that an individual may
maintain a private cause of action is amply supported in the leg-
islative history of Title VI itself. In short, a fair consideration of
petitioner's tardy attack on the propriety of Bakke's suit under
Title VI requires that it be rejected.96
Justice White was the lone dissenter on this issue.
The Court next addressed this issue in Cannon, and though
again shying away from a holding, it provided the lower courts with
guidance. Title IX, it noted, is patterned after Title VI and to a
certain degree its holding that Title IX provides a private cause of
action was based on its view that Title VI contained a private cause
of action. In response to defendant's arguments "(1) that a compari-
son of Title VI with other Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
demonstrates that Congress created express private remedies when-
ever it found them desirable; and (2) that certain excerpts from the
legislative history of Title VI foreclose the implication of a private
remedy," 97 a plurality (Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall)
93. Id. at 566.
94. Id. at 571 n.2.
The issue of whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, and there-
fore may be assumed without being decided. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979).
95. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
96. Id. at 419-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
97. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 710.
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responded:
Even if these arguments were persuasive with respect to Con-
gress' understanding in 1964 when it passed Title VI, they would
not overcome the fact that in 1972 when it passed Title IX, Con-
gress was under the impression that Title VI could be enforced by
a private action and that Title IX would be similarly enforceable.
See supra, at 696-699. "For the relevant inquiry is not whether
Congress correctly perceived the then state of law, but rather
what its perception of the state of the law was." Brown v. GSA,
425 U.S. 820, 828. But each of respondents' arguments h, in any
event unpersuasive.
98
The lower courts have unanimously perceived the Supreme
Court's message to be that there is a private cause of action under
Title VI. Every court that has addressed this issue since Lau, Bakke
and Cannon has held that private litigants can sue under Title VI;
previously most courts had held the same.99
98. Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added). As noted above, Chief Justice Burger, while a cir-
cuit court of appeals judge had already held that Title VI creates a private cause of action.
Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911
(1967). He concurred in Cannon.
Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that Titles VI and IX may not always be
treated alike, and concomitantly the fact that Title IX provides a cause of action does not
necessarily mean that Title VI does. In Curran the Court noted the following:
When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Congress in-
tended to create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement pro-
visions of the statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an
implied private remedy has already been recognized by the courts, however, the
inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have intended to create a new
remedy, since one already existed; the question is whether Congress intended to
preserve the preexisting remedy.
102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982). This is precisely the distinction between Title VI and IX.
When Congress enacted Title VI the question was whether it intended to create a private
cause of action. When it passed Title IX, using the same language which courts had held to
have provided a cause of action, the question was whether Congress intended to acquiesce to
the judicial interpretation. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982) (the
court discounted the importance of Title VI to the proper interpretation of Title IX and held
that though Title VI did not normally cover employees, employment discrimination does
come within Title IX's prohibition). These cases, notwithstanding, the Court's clearest sig-
nals, have been that Title VI does provide a private cause of action.
99. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1982); Kling
v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); N.A.A.C.P. v. Medical Center, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1247 (3d 1979); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977);
Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801, afld en banc, 558 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 912 (1978); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.
1973); Hatton v. County Bd. of Educ., 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1970); Bossier Parish School
Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Davis v. Modine
Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943 (D. Kan. 1981); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.
Pa. 1981); Coleman v. Casey City Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980); Yakin v.
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Nor has Congress corrected the Courts. On the contrary it has
repeatedly enacted legislation predicated on the assumption that Ti-
tle VI may be enforced in a private suit.
Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,1°° and Section
901(a) of Title IX,' 0° promulgated in 1972, are patterned after Title
VI.10 2 When enacting those statutes Congress never indicated that
they should be interpreted any differently than the way the courts
had been interpreting Title VI. 113 The enactment of section 718 of
the 1972 Education Amendments supports this conclusion.10 4 It
provided that "[ulpon the entry of a final order . . . for failure to
comply with any provision of this chapter or for discrimination on
the basis of race, color or national origin in violation of title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . the court. . . may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs." This language explicitly presumed the
availability of private suits to enforce Title VI.10 5 Although posten-
actment developments are not accorded the weight of contemporary
legislative history they nonetheless are authoritative expressions de-
termining the scope of Title VI.1°6
As noted above, if the test for implying a private cause of ac-
tion--congressional intent-were applied to Title VI, no cause of
action could be found. The courts and Congress have reached the
opposite result because this test is new. Title VI has in the past been
analyzed by the Supreme Court and derivatively by the lower courts
under more liberal standards for implying private causes of action.
University of Illinois, 508 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp.
933, 937 n.1l (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Tayyani v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365
(D.N.M. 1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Rios v. Read, 480 F.
Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Association Against Discrimination in Employment Inc. v. City
of Bridgeport; 479 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn., 1979), aj7'd inpart and vacated in part, 647 F.2d
256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1611 (1982); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F.
Supp. 842 (D. Neb. 1975), aftd, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975). But see, Green St. Ass'n v.
Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967) (Title VI does not allow a
private cause of action). Cf. Community Brotherhood of Lynn, Inc. v. Lynn Redevelopment
Auth., 523 F. Supp. 779 (D. Mass. 1981); Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp.
321, 323 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1979).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1976).
102. All three statutes use almost the same language. The main difference is that Title VI
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, while Title IX prohibits it on the basis of
gender and section 504 proscribes discrimination against the handicapped.
103. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420 n.27 (1978).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed 1978).
105. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699.
106. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1925 (1982).
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Congress did not know the burden was on it to express an intent to
allow or deny private suits, and it deferred to the Court's analyses of
the statute.
0 7
Our legal system is not a stagnant institution; it undergoes con-
stant flux. The Supreme Court has overruled itself in the past, and
it could indeed retreat from its prior statements in Lau, Bakke, and
Cannon and hold that Title VI does not create a private cause of
action. This would be a drastic step, however, overruling the vast
body of law which has emerged in the last eighteen years and Con-
gress' implicit acquiescence therein. In past analogous situations the
Court has refused to take this step, and it should show the same
restraint here.
Title VI would then stand on the same footing as section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.108 A private cause of action
was first implied under section 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., over thirty years ago.'0 9 Since then a substantial body of case
law and commentary has arisen explicitly and implicitly finding a
private cause of action under that statute. Section 10(b) did not by
its terms create one, and there is no indication that Congress con-
templated such a remedy. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court con-
firmed that "the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the statute. . . is now well established."" 0 The Court seemed to
acknowledge that long-standing federal court precedent uniformly
recognizing an implied right should weigh in favor of implication."'
By forging a new test which relies on congressional .intent the
Court restructured the process through which private causes of ac-
tion are recognized. To be sure, Congress is now on notice that if it
wants to include a private cause of action it should make its inten-
tions clear; in the absence of clear congressional intent none will be
107. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976).
109. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
110. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citations omitted).
Ill. Nor has the Court's espousal of the congressional intent analysis undermined its
deference to practical considerations. In Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706 n.40 the Court observed
the following:
This Court has frequently accepted a history of federal-court recognition of a
cause of action as indicative of the propriety of its implication. Eg., Blue Cho
Stamps Y. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S., at 730; Machinists Y. Central Airlines,
supra, at 690; Texas & Paco'c R Co. v. igsby, 241 U.S. at 39.
In Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1845 n.88 (1982), the
Court reaffirmed that it would imply a private cause of action where over a long period of
time all other courts had been doing so. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
577-78 n.19 (1979).
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implied. The message to the lower courts is equally clear. They
cannot legislate a cause of action, but must look solely to Congress'
intent. However, this would apply only to statutes which are now
promulgated or which have never or seldom been ruled upon. The
Supreme Court should refrain from casting aside eighteen years of
law, which it itself propagated. If faced with the decision, it should
acquiesce in the vast body of law which has allowed litigants to im-
ply a private cause of action under Title VI.II2
112. This would be consistent with what Justice Rehnquist said in his concurrence in
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718.
It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly adverted apprise
the lawmaking branch of the Federal Government that the ball, so to speak, may
well now be in its court. Not only is it "far better" for Congress to-so specify when
it intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this
Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent
such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.
He seems to have suggested that the new test for implying a private cause of action, congres-
sional intent, be applied prospectively.

